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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1921 to 1928, the Bolsheviks consolidated a one party dictatorship
in Russia and, in the arena of economic policy, presided with relaxed control
over an underdeveloped, mostly agrarian society that suddenly during the
civil war years had become overwhelmingly a land of smallholding
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farmers. 1 After 1928, there was brutal forced collectivization in the
countryside.2 According to Stephen Cohen’s 1973 biography of the Bolshevik
leader Nikolai Bukharin, Bukharin elaborated and pressed for a moderate
Communism that would reject coercive squeezing of peasants to fund
rapid industrialization in the cities and would instead rely on private
ownership and market exchange in rural areas and slow industrial growth,
accompanied by wide cultural freedom—but no political freedoms.3
Compared to the nightmare that actually unfolded in the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Bukharin’s vision looks good. I am not a Russian historian.
For all I know, the actual Bukharin might have been a monster.4 Bukharin’s
policy proposals for Russia in the 1920s, if implemented, might have proved
to be utter disasters. But the tantalizing sketch of an alternative future for
Russian communism that Cohen’s Bukharin offers is a vivid reminder of
the obvious truth that dictatorships—along with other types of nondemocratic
regimes—vary in qualities to which political theorists should be attentive.
This is especially the case if you are an instrumentalist regarding the
justification of democracy. The instrumentalist holds that the political
governance system for a society that ought to be established and sustained
in given circumstances is the one the operation of which would bring
about best consequences as assessed by impartial moral principles.5 The
instrumentalist democrat holds that in modern times in a wide array of settings
the instrumentalist criterion selects democracy as likely to be productive
of best consequences.
“Democracy, yes or no?” is not the only question the instrumentalist
should be considering. An instrumentalist criterion will also, in principle,
select among the feasible alternative types of democratic systems that might
be put in place in given circumstances. Moreover, the question whether
1. STEPHEN F. COHEN, BUKHARIN AND THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL
BIOGRAPHY 1888–1938, at 123 (1973).
2. Id. at 337.
3. See id. at 161, 165–66.
4. For another view, see RICHARD PIPES, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN
REVOLUTION 343–406 (1995).
5. Instrumentalism, under the label “best results theory,” is characterized, and
criticized, in CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY
31–48 (1989). For a defense of a version of the doctrine, see generally RONALD DWORKIN,
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000). For further defense,
see Richard J. Arneson, Democracy Is Not Intrinsically Just, in JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY
40, 40–42 (Keith Dowding, Robert E. Goodin & Carole Pateman eds., 2004); Richard J.
Arneson, Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Levels, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY
118 (David Copp, Jean Hampton & John E. Roemer eds., 1993); Richard Arneson, Elitism,
in 2 OXFORD STUDIES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 156, 167–68 (David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne &
Steven Wall eds., 2016) [hereinafter Arneson, Elitism]; Richard J. Arneson, The Supposed
Right to a Democratic Say, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 197,
197 (Thomas Christiano & John Christman eds., 2009).
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to seek to create or sustain democracy is not a binary issue. The question
also arises, to what degree should a political society be democratic—or
better, since a political system admits of being more or less democratic
along various dimensions, the question is, along the various dimensions
to which a governance system might be more or less democratic, to what
degree should the system be democratic?
Furthermore, to assess whether, say, Canada or Pakistan or Venezuela
in present circumstances ought to be democratically governed and, if so,
to what degree, we need to assess feasible nondemocratic alternatives.
After all, the choice we are making is a comparative one. Winston Churchill
famously quipped that democracy is the worst political system except for
all the rest.6 Along the same line, to defend some undemocratic regime
for Canada today we need not argue that a nondemocratic alternative system
would likely produce good results. All we would need to show is that the
best undemocratic regime that Canada could adopt today, even if it would
be likely to yield miserable outcomes in terms of, for example, human
rights fulfillment and human well-being spread across individuals, would
yield outcomes a bit better than any other system we might put in place
instead.
Asking what the best feasible political governance system for a country
at a time is admits of different interpretations, depending on the gloss we
are placing on “feasible.” We might be thinking of the best feasible system
as the best system that could be installed, in present circumstances, if a set
of people sufficient to bring about the shift could be convinced to team up
to effect it. A more restricted feasibility question would be posed if we
asked instead, taking for granted the actual beliefs and attitudes and their
entrenchment in the present members of society now, what is the best
move from the status quo that, if proposed to them, would elicit sufficient
allegiance from some of them, to effect the shift? The first way of posing
the question has us set aside actual beliefs and attitudes of people now that
bear on the question, what are the available options for regime change.
A more practical question to pose would be incremental. Given the present
political system in a country of interest, would it be better in instrumental
terms to push it in a more or a less democratic and to what extent? For
simplicity, I stick in this Article to posing the issue at the more abstract
level.

6.

Eur. Parl. Deb. (444) col. 207 (Nov. 11, 1947) (remarks of Mr. Churchill).
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II. GROUP PEOPLE IN POLITICAL SOCIETIES SO THAT
DEMOCRACY WORKS WELL
If there should be democracy, people should be grouped together in political
societies in ways that facilitate democracies functioning well.
Christian List and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi have, in effect, observed
that the democratic instrumentalists poses their question too narrowly if
they ask: given this political society at this time, should we stick with the
status quo degree of democracy it embodies, or instead seek more, or less?7
A broader question would be: if we decided that democratic governance
is always better than alternative modes of governance in instrumental
accounting, then how might people band together in political societies in
such a way that the societies are able to function democratically and able
to bring about best results? A still broader question would be, how might
people band together in political societies in such a way that, if each is
arranged democratically or nondemocratically, in whatever way that would
produce best results, overall better results would be brought about than
would be brought about under any alternative configuration of national
borders?
Of course, there might be other standards that should play a role in
determining what boundaries dividing separate political societies would
be ideal. Maybe, in some circumstances, there is a right to secession, a
right belonging to a compact subgroup of an existing political society to
split off, taking some territory and forming a new independent state. Maybe,
in some circumstances, there is a right to accession, a right belonging
to the members of one state to join up with another and form one unified
political society. Set these issues, this hornet’s nest, aside.
To illustrate, perhaps some states as presently constituted are too
fragmented and divided to be able to function well as democracies. If
democracy facilitates good governance, then maybe some of these states
need to be broken apart and reconstituted as new states. Maybe in the areas
of the Middle East, where Jewish and Palestinian people are heavily
concentrated, the prospects for a functioning democracy in which Israeli
Jews and Israeli and Palestinian Arabs mix it up on equal terms are poor,
and the prospects for well-functioning democracies would be increased if
political boundaries were to establish a mostly-Jewish state and a mostlyArab state. Maybe in the Trump era of the United States, prospects for a
well-functioning U.S. democracy are poor, and these prospects would be
7. List and Koenig-Archibugi are discussing other issues, not this one, but what they
say has the plain implication I am rehearsing. See Christian List & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi,
Can There Be a Global Demos? An Agency-Based Approach, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 76,
78–79 (2010).
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increased if the current United States was divided into two separate and
independent political societies, Redland and Blueland.
III. RELATIONAL EGALITARIAN STANDARDS CAN REQUIRE
NONDEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS
In some circumstances, relational egalitarian standards for assessing the
consequences of instituting one or another form of political arrangements
will require nondemocratic political arrangements.
In passing, I note that the instrumental approach to democracy leaves it
entirely open what are the correct, impartial standards for assessing the
results of the operation of one or another form of political governance that
might be installed. This implies that the best results approach, as such, is
not committed to the assessment of outcomes in welfarist terms, counting
a political regime as morally suitable to the extent that it would bring
about better lives for people or, alternatively, lives higher in well-being,
with aggregate well-being spread fairly across the members of society.
Nor is the best results approach committed to the broader standard that
political regimes should be assessed according to their distributive outcomes
—the distribution of resources.8
To highlight the point, consider that a best results approach could adopt
some version of relational egalitarianism as the appropriate outcome
assessment standard without thereby committing itself to a preference for
democratic over nondemocratic regimes. It all depends.
It depends on what sort of relational egalitarianism is the most plausible
version, for starters. The relational egalitarian holds that it is prima facie
very morally important that people relate as equals or be related as equals.
Different versions of what relating as equals and being related as equals
amount to have been proposed.9 Elizabeth Anderson holds that relational

8. The distribution of resources might be measured by the Rawlsian primary social
goods, or resources as interpreted by Ronald Dworkin, or capabilities as construed by Amartya
Sen or Martha Nussbaum. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 2–
3 (2011); DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 237; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES:
THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 18–19 (2011); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 39–55 (1992).
9. A full discussion would need to engage with the views of Samuel Scheffler,
whose writings on this topic have been seminal. See generally Samuel Scheffler, Choice,
Circumstance, and the Value of Equality, 4 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 5 (2005); Samuel Scheffler,
The Practice of Equality, in SOCIAL EQUALITY: ON WHAT IT MEANS TO BE EQUALS 21
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egalitarian justice requires that all members of society be continuously
enabled to function as full, participating members of democratic society.10
This version builds a commitment to democratic political organization into
the notion of relating as equals. Other versions leave this question open,
or at least leave the door ajar somewhat.
A. Kolodny
Niko Kolodny understands the ideal of social equality—relating as
equals—in terms of three relations of inequality: (1) some have greater
formal or informal power over others and are not firmly disposed to refrain
from using that power on the ground that doing so would wrong those
with less power; (2) some have greater authority than others, meaning that
they can issue orders to which the others would mostly comply and are
not firmly disposed to refrain from issuing such orders on the ground that
doing so would wrong those with less authority; and (3) some have attributes
that “generally attract greater consideration than the corresponding attributes
of others.”11 “Consideration” here functions as a technical term. It gathers
together kinds of responses that we should regard either as inappropriate
for anyone to receive or as appropriate for everyone to receive, just by
virtue of being a person.
A society satisfies the social equality ideal just in case either the three
relations of social equality are absent, or, if they do exist, there is equal
opportunity among all members of society continuously to exit any such
relations that happen to obtain, with a further proviso that the badness, from
the social equality standpoint, of unavoidable relations of equality that
obtain, is attenuated or eliminated to the degree that their terms are set by
political decision-making in which all members of society have formal
and informal positive equal influence.
Kolodny affirms that social equality is valuable in itself, not merely as
a means to the achievement of other values.12 He suggests that the justification
of democracy is that democratic governance is a very important constituent
(Carina Fourie, Fabian Schuppert & Ivo Wallimann-Helmer eds., 2015); Samuel Scheffler,
What Is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5, 5, 13 (2003). For discussion, see generally
KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, RELATIONAL EGALITARIANISM: LIVING AS EQUALS chs. 2–3
(2018); AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996).
10. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 289
(1999); see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR
LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 3, 37 (2017); Elizabeth Anderson, Democracy:
Instrumental vs. Non-Instrumental Value, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 213, 214–25 (Thomas Christiano & John Christman eds., 2009).
11. Niko Kolodny, Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of
Democracy, 42 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 287, 295–96 (2014).
12. See id. at 323.
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of a society in which people are related as social equals rather than as
inferior and superiors.13 Democracy both partly constitutes social equality
and is an important means to sustaining other constituents of social equality.
My modest suggestion is that, on this account, it might turn out to be
the case that in some, perhaps even pervasive circumstances, establishing
and sustaining some nondemocratic form of political governance is required
in order to bring about a society that comes as close as is feasible to being
a society of social equality. Call this nondemocratic social equality. The
regime of nondemocratic social equality will not perfectly achieve social
equality, but in some circumstances, any attempt to instantiate democratic
social equality would do worse on this score.
To illustrate the possibility, imagine a social egalitarian leader. The leader
controls the political process, and no one comes close to being the leader’s
rival. So, there is enormous deviation from relations of social equality.
The leader has lopsided power and authority, and these relations of inequality
are unavoidable and not attenuated by regulation by a political process in
which all have equal influence. Nonetheless, the leader rules in such a
way as to sustain wide relations of equality across all members of society
but for the leader.
A less extreme version of the same would be a John Stuart Mill style
plural voting scheme that distributes extra votes and so extra political power
to those who pass some test of political competence.14
The nondemocratic political regime dedicated to maximizing social
equality cannot fully achieve its goal without ceasing to be nondemocratic.
But full achievement might be impossible to reach no matter what political
arrangements are in place. The various possible regimes would likely score
higher along some but not all dimensions, so a weighing is needed to establish
which regime, all things considered, scores higher on the Kolodny social
equality standard. We could certainly imagine nondemocratic regimes in
which the kowtowing and bowing and scraping toward the select small
political elite by the rest of us would be so extreme as to outweigh social
equality relations established across nonelite persons. But just as one can
imagine a workplace with a democratic culture, even if the owner is in charge,
one can imagine a political society in which relations between elite and

13. See id.
14. For a careful critical discussion of the idea, see David Estlund, Why Not Epistocracy?,
in DESIRE, IDENTITY, AND EXISTENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF T.M. PENNER 53, 53–54 (Naomi
Reshotko ed., 2003).
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nonelite are broadly egalitarian rather than resembling feudal hierarchy.
Hence, the possibility to which I draw attention: Nondemocratic social
equality.
One could minimize the significance of this possibility by noting the
feature of Kolodny’s view that says that the badness, by the social egalitarian
standard, of unavoidable relations of inequality among people in society
is diminished or possibly even eliminated to the degree these inequalities
are regulated by democratic political decision-making over which all have
equal influence.15 If one gives this particular element in Kolodny’s view
enormous weight, it becomes very difficult to see how a nondemocratic
regime could, all things considered, be more social egalitarian than a
democratic one.16
However, giving this particular element enormous weight looks implausible
and unmotivated within Kolodny’s framework. Picture Northern Ireland
in the mid-twentieth century, with democratic governance and a very stable
Protestant majority. Suppose this very stable Protestant majority passes
legislation that subordinates Catholics to Protestants in many ways. Yet
political democracy is intact; no Catholic is denied the vote, and political
association and free speech deliberation among Catholics are not suppressed.
The society we are imagining is rigidly hierarchical, and it is rigidly hierarchical
via democratic mechanisms. Any sane weighting of the elements in the
Kolodny social equality ideal must yield the judgment that this society—
which might be pretty close to actual Northern Ireland conditions during
stretches of the twentieth century—must rank very low by social equality
norms. Hierarchy regulated with gusto by a democratic state can still be
vicious hierarchy. For another example, suppose a genuinely democratic
society regulates unavoidable relations of inequality between professors
15. See Kolodny, supra note 11, at 309–10.
16. The text here does not adequately register an important aspect of Kolodny’s
view of social equality and democracy. The social equality ideal as he understands it does
not require that citizens have positive influence on political decision-making, so long as
they have equal influence. See id. at 309. If they equally had zero influence and political
outcomes were somehow determined by some type of random process not manipulated or
controlled by any citizens, that situation would not offend against the social equality ideal.
Only if some members of society have positive influence on political decisions does the ideal
of social equality require that all have equal influence, both formal and informal. Kolodny
finds plausible the thought that social equality rules out forms of political governance that
give some individuals unequal political power and best results considerations select democracy
as the superior option from the set of possible forms of governance that are compatible
with social equality. See id. at 309–10. But there are other possibilities. To resolve the
poor incentive properties of democratic systems with large electorates, one might favor
randomly selecting a small group of citizens who would be given resources and time to become
well informed about issues, and after due deliberation, select policy by majority rule. See
Alexander A. Guerrero, Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative, 42 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 135, 155–56 (2014).
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and students, medical doctors and patients, bankers and customers, and
public officials and regular citizens in such a way that they resemble
feudal relations more than relations we have observed in modern times.
This democratic feudalism should also be assigned a low social equality
score.
B. Pettit
Philip Pettit proclaims that if we secure republican freedom for all, in
practical terms, this will be a sufficient condition for securing social justice.17
That is to say, republican freedom is in itself a great justice value, and it
will, as a matter of likely contingent fact, carry along with it any further
justice values there are. Take care of republican freedom, and the other
values we should care about will take care of themselves.
You have republican freedom, freedom as nondomination, to choose
among certain options just in case: (1) you have adequate resources to
enact any of the options and will not be subject to deliberate interference
if you choose it; (2) the first condition holds no matter which option you
prefer to choose; and (3) the first condition holds regardless of the preferences
of any other persons regarding how you—or people of your kind—should
choose. You qualify as a free person in your society just in case you have
freedom as nondomination with respect to the basic liberties. The basic
liberties in a society at a time are those that all can enjoy together. If a liberty
is basic, anyone can exercise it, no matter how many others are exercising
it, and anyone can gain value from exercising it, no matter how many others
are exercising and gaining value from it. A society that protects freedom
as nondomination for all with respect to the basic liberties protects all the
liberties that fit this description. Notably, according to Pettit, freedom as
nondomination, which he takes to be freedom at its best, is lacking if you
have the secure opportunity freedom to, say, cross the bridge back and forth
as you choose, but the following description also applies: There is a troll
living under the bridge who could interfere with your bridge crossings but
is rock solidly disposed not to interfere, from conviction or stable desires,
and all this is common knowledge.18
17. See PHILIP PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM: A MORAL COMPASS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD
80–81 (2014) [hereinafter PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM]; PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A
REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 3 (2012).
18. See Matthew H. Kramer, Liberty and Domination, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL
THEORY 31, 47–48 (Cécile Laborde & John Maynor eds., 2008).
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Oddly, Pettit also affirms the eyeball test for whether or not one is a free
citizen among others. This test for people’s being free from domination
with respect to the basic liberties is that “absent excessive timidity or the
like, they are enabled by the most demanding local standards to look one
another in the eye without reason for fear or deference.”19 In the bridge
example, the troll dominates you, and you lack freedom as nondomination
with respect to this choice. But by the eyeball test, you are free, indeed a
free citizen among others. If you bowed or scraped or kowtowed to the
troll, the troll would think you were being weirdly unreasonable and might
well feel insulted, as unjustly accused. I admit, the freedom in question
here is not a basic liberty, but it would be child’s play to amend the example
so the point sticks. Let there be trolls everywhere hanging out on the edges
of streets and highways, and the basic liberty in question, the freedom of
each citizen to travel freely on public roadways, fast or slowly depending on
conditions, with all others, limited only by traffic safety rules and congestion.
According to Pettit’s account, social interaction is rife with potential for
domination.20 The standard for freedom he upholds is demanding, so
satisfying it will be a tricky and difficulty task.21 But the task can be done.
Pettit seeks an achievable social justice norm, not a recipe for utopian pie
in the sky.22 He holds that a well-functioning state can secure the basic
liberties for all, eliminating or reducing almost to nothing what he calls
horizontal domination—domination of one private individual by others.23
The state brings it about that all have adequate resources to take care of
themselves. In addition, if I am physically stronger than you and able to beat
you up, and potentially able to wield that strength to threaten and bully you,
the state, by appropriate criminal law enactment and enforcement, can coerce
me into not beating you up and not implicitly or explicitly threatening you
with a bashing.24 This leaves the worry that the state, or those who wield
state power as public officials or control the state, including the majority
of voters in a democracy, will be unavoidably in a position of vertical

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 99.
See id. at 112.
See id. at 187.
See id.
See id. at xviii–xix, 113.
See ROBERT S. TAYLOR, EXIT LEFT: MARKETS AND MOBILITY IN REPUBLICAN
THOUGHT 1–4 (2017). Taylor highlights what he takes to be the effectiveness of providing
people with genuine exit options from what might prove to be relationships between persons
that involve domination. Id. at 34. Rather than trying to regulate romantic and marriage
relations, or job and employment relations, to eliminate domination within them, we make
sure people have real freedom to exit romances and jobs they find onerous in domination
terms.
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domination.25 Some citizens will dominate others via the state. Pettit’s
response is that, in the right sort of contestatory and deliberative democracy,
this threat of vertical domination will be eliminated.26 There remains only
the threat that the people of one political society might be dominated by
external powers, by foreign states or groups of external nonstate agents.
This threat is extinguished by a republican international order that deters
states from interfering in the sovereign liberty of other states.
But we can imagine a scenario in which the political regime, among
those available for installation, that would best eliminate horizontal domination
by some private members of society over others, unavoidably sets in place
some significant extent of vertical domination. Let us add the claim that
the dominating state power is troll like. Under this state regime, no individuals
or groups who exercise dominating power over some members of society
with respect to the basic liberties are in the slightest dispose to abuse this
power they have over others. No one interferes with basic liberties. Nor
does anyone use state power to threaten such interference in order to gain
advantages for the threatener. In contrast, if this sort of regime were not
in place, the horizontal domination among private individuals in society
would give rise to actual abuse, wrongful interference, bullying, and
worse. Pettit insists that freedom at its best is freedom as nondomination,
but he does not hold that there is no moral difference between relations of
bare domination—such as between the troll and bridge crossers—and relations
that add actual interference and threat of interference in significant matters
to bare domination.27 In this situation, it is a more urgent matter to do
away with the latter horrible domination than to do away with the more
benign sort. And we are stipulating that in the situation under review, the
maintenance of relatively benign vertical domination is causally necessary

25. The “majority” of voters might seem too shifting a group to constitute a dominator.
See AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION
28–30 (1977). In a democracy, various coalitions of voters will coalesce into one, and
then another, winning majority over time. But at any given time, a majority coalition might
have the power to interfere broadly in some people’s affairs, restricting their basic liberties,
at that time. And anyway, some majority coalitions may be stable over time in societies
with deep cleavages. See id. at 16. See generally AREND LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY:
POWER SHARING AND MAJORITY RULE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 109–38 (2008).
26. For discussion of this claim, see generally Frank Lovett & Philip Pettit, Preserving
Republican Freedom: A Reply to Simpson, 46 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 363 (2019); Thomas W.
Simpson, The Impossibility of Republican Freedom, 45 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 27 (2017).
27. See PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 113.
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in order to extirpate—or reduce to a tolerable minimum—the vicious
horizontal domination just sketched.
In the scenario just indicated, republican justice calls for nondemocracy.
Bringing it about that, so far as is possible in these circumstances, all
members of society are securely free from domination with respect to the
basic liberties requires supporting a nondemocratic regime. The assumptions
needed to establish this conclusion should be plainly stated. First, we
assume that even though domination is a multidimensional bad, we
can roughly aggregate across the dimensions and arrive in some cases at
all things considered judgments to the effect that situation A is better than
situation B from the standpoint of domination reduction. Second, we assume
that this sort of judgment can take the form of determining that here and
now, elimination of horizontal domination in society does more to reduce
bad domination than would eliminating vertical domination as far as we
can. The third assumption is that, in specified circumstances, the regime
that can effectively eliminate horizontal domination is a nondemocratic regime,
not a democratic regime. A fourth assumption is there are no countervailing
considerations, for example, that eliminating egregious forms of horizontal
domination by tolerating nonegregious forms of vertical domination will
not also bring along other evils in its train sufficient to outweigh these
nondomination gains.
The preceding discussion is not seeking to recruit relational egalitarians
such as Kolodny and Pettit to march under the banner of instrumentalism
concerning democracy. They are not instrumentalists. For each of them,
in somewhat different ways, democracy partly constitutes a relational
egalitarian society—one in which, for Kolodny, social equality prevails,
and for Pettit, relations of domination with respect to basic liberties are
minimized. I am simply noting that if one started with a commitment to
a best results standard for choice of political regime, one could adopt a
relational egalitarian standard for assessing best results, and the resulting
view would endorse nondemocracy, even when democracy would be feasible,
in some circumstances, despite the fact that democratic political arrangements
are partly constitutive of relational equality as well as prodigiously effective
instruments for securing it in a wide array of circumstances. Moreover,
by the same token, instrumentalism yoked to a relational egalitarian standard
for assessing outcomes would, in some possible circumstances, endorse
nondemocracy when other outcome standards would not. It could be that
securing robust democratic arrangements would facilitate best results
according to hedonism, or some other welfarist standard, or a Dworkinian
ideal of equality of resources, whereas in the same circumstances, best results
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interpreted in relational egalitarian terms would favor nondemocratic over
democratic arrangements.28
It should be mentioned that deontological issues arise, insofar as a best
results theory, even if not interpreted as yoked to a consequentialist background
moral theory, at least sets such background issues to the side. Consider
Kolodny. His version of relational egalitarianism would respect the moral
significance of a distinction between doing and allowing and would not,
for example, endorse perpetrating one instance of slavery so that two others
elsewhere would be averted. This point does not, so far as I can see, undercut
my claims about the compatibility in some circumstances of maximizing
fulfillment of relational egalitarian ideals and establishing and sustaining
nondemocratic governance.
IV. FAIR PROCEDURES CAN REQUIRE NONDEMOCRATIC
ARRANGEMENTS
The instrumentalist says, we should institute whatever form of political
rule will generate best results, impartially assessed. If we say instead, fair
procedures should play a role in the choice of what form of political rule
to institute, and democracy is a uniquely fair political procedure, we might
yet justify nondemocratic arrangements in some circumstances.
If we ask, how should we assess varieties of nondemocratic governance,
the instrumentalist answer looks to be painfully obvious. We assess
nondemocratic constitutions as we would assess any political regime. Any
political regime is a tool, to be assessed entirely by the consequences,
impartially assessed, of putting it in place and sustaining it, compared to
available alternatives. That is it. Period. End of story.
One might claim: all the action is going to appear in conflicts about which
purportedly impartial standard for assessing the outcomes to which various
alternative political regimes might lead are actually sensibly impartial and
substantively correct. But that cannot be right. Some say, democracy is an
intrinsically fair procedure for resolving conflicts among people, independently

28. A hedonist standard would assess political regimes as better or worse according
to the total aggregate of pleasure net of pain brought about for members. A welfarist standard
would assess regimes according to some function of the individual well-being attained by
members. The Dworkinian equality of resources ideal is outlined by Ronald Dworkin.
See generally Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).
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of the outcomes it generates, much as a coin flip is a fair procedure for
resolving conflicts in some situations.
Notice though that one could accept that there are intrinsically fair
procedures, and that we morally ought sometimes to follow fair procedures
even at cost to outcome values, without accepting democratic proceduralism.
For example, one might hold that if one has no choice but to impose a
significant, indivisible good or bad on one of two persons, and there are
no differences between the persons that warrant pushing the indivisible
thing on one or the other of them, one ought to give each an equal chance
of gaining the thing, if good, or avoiding it, if bad, rather than simply pick
one or the other person as its recipient.29 Accepting this, one might still
dismiss the idea that democracy is intrinsically a fair procedure for determining
what policies a state should pursue.
V. SCENARIOS THAT MORALLY REQUIRE NONDEMOCRACY
Two examples illustrating scenarios in which nondemocracy, not democracy,
would be morally required.
Here is a simple example to illustrate the claim that one does not have
a moral right to participate in decisions about what a collective, of which
one is a member, ought to do when one lacks competence to make good
decisions for the collective. This is an illustration, not an argument. I am
simply appealing to the reader’s considered judgment. Suppose five people,
by accident and without any prearrangement, find themselves in peril high
on a mountain. The steepness of the slope makes it imperative that they
be roped together. Three of the people are experienced mountaineers with
track records of guiding people in various problematic situations to safety.
Two are utterly inexperienced and lack mountain savvy. To move down
the slope toward safety, the collective of the five roped-together individuals
needs to make decisions about strategy and tactics that all accept and follow.
The two inexperienced individuals propose that since all are equally affected
by the collective decisions, all ought to have an equal democratic say in
making those decisions. To this, the objection is made that no one has a
moral right to insist on participation in decision-making where one’s participation
worsens the quality of the decisions and this imposes serious and avoidable
costs on others. On this ground, the proposal is made that decisions be
made by the trio of the experienced, competent members of the roped party.
The trio members happen to be stronger, so they force the others to accept
this proposal.

29. See Peter A. Diamond, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal
Comparison of Utility: Comment, 75 J. POL. ECON. 765, 765–66 (1967).
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I am in solidarity with the trio in the situation as so far characterized.
The morally correct policy is that the competent should rule in this setting.
Someone might accept this verdict but hold that the example is too high
stakes to enable us to determine whether there is some moral right, perhaps a
fairly weak right, to participate in joint decision-making affecting one’s
life. The high stakes will make it difficult for us to discern the presence
of a weak right, outweighed in the particular example.
In response, political decision-making that determines the content of
state policies is a very high stakes matter. So even if there were a small
pro tanto consideration favoring avoidance of imposed hierarchy, it would
be outweighed when the issue is the choice of a form of governance for a
political society in our world.
We could also fiddle with the example to lower the stakes. Let the slope
be not so steep, soft snow everywhere, and the consequences of following
a mistaken route merely broken bones or an extra night of agony in the
extreme cold. I submit that we should still discern no right to a democratic
say based on the moral imperative of hierarchy avoidance.
Notice that the case for elite rule here need not rest on a controversial
acceptance of paternalism—the claim that it is morally acceptable to
restrict people’s liberty against their will for their own good.30 In this
example, and more generally when what is on offer is choice of a form of
governance for a country, the restriction of people’s liberty that is being
endorsed is restriction of their liberty for the good of other people. To
make this vivid, suppose that in the mountain peril example, it is possible
for one or two individuals to go their own way down any of several alternate
paths, at slight extra risk to themselves, and no cost imposed on those left
behind on the rope, which can function well with just three roped together.
Suppose the two recalcitrant community members are at liberty to go it
alone in this way—or even if this scenario is not possible, we could
suppose that all are disposed to offer the go it alone option to anyone who
would choose it, even if this was a self-harming choice for that person, if
it were the case that this possibility were actual.
Another reasonable objection to this stilted example as a good intuition
pump for eliciting considered judgments about the moral quality of hierarchy
is that the situation described is a temporary emergency. One might

30. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/paternalism [http://perma.cc/SU62-DRLG] (last updated Feb. 12, 2017); see
Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 105, 107–08 (1971).
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reasonably tolerate an autocracy in an emergency that would be intolerable if
extended over a long time frame. In response, let the mountain be very
tall and progress down it, by necessity, very slow. As one gradually gets
lower, conditions become more salubrious, but one never gets off the mountain.
One’s life will consist of descending with one’s four thrown-together
companions. All else equal, this shift does not worsen the case for autocracy.
Or at least, if there is a problem in the revised example, it stems from the
small numbers involved. But this is an artificial detail in the admittedly
contrived mountain peril example.
The small-scale scenario involves persons who, even though strangers
before being thrown together, are pressed into intimate personal contact.
This feature of the example is heightened in the variant in which the persons
roped together must spend years of their lives in prolonged close contact.
In the revised example, it becomes necessary for political superiors and
inferiors to live their lives in close, intimate proximity to each other. One
might believe that imposed hierarchy in personal relations is either bad in
itself or tends in several unavoidable ways to give rise to bads. In contrast,
political hierarchy is, or need not be, a face to face encounter. It is a longdistance encounter operating through impersonally mediated channels. If
we imagine a scaled up version of the mountain peril example with large
numbers, no one need accept a boss in their intimate private life, in order
to reap—what we are assuming to be are—the benefits of political decisionmaking when entry to the club of decision makers is restricted.31
My disinclination to feel personally bullied by government legislators
who pass bills I dislike has not much to do with the possible fact that I had
a democratic say in their selection and instead arises from the fact that I
do not have any personal contact with these legislators, much less regular
personal contact. So even if one thought hierarchy in close personal relations
is always bad, that is consistent with denying that hierarchy in large-scale
interactions at a distance must be bad.
Here is another type of example that sheds light on the conditions that
render nondemocratic rule morally acceptable and submission to nondemocratic
rule morally required. Suppose a boatload of refugees sinks offshore from
a beach on which sunbathers are congregated. Many refugees are suddenly
in peril of drowning. Let us assume, as is surely plausible, that all of the

31. To clarify, here I do not make any commitment to the claim that hierarchy is
bad in itself in close personal relationships, or that hierarchy in such relationships always
brings in its train bads that outweigh goods. My claim is merely that holding that view
would be no bar to also holding that basic political arrangements should be set in whatever
way, hierarchical or not, that would produce the morally best outcomes. That arrangements
should be set in this way is compatible with the existence of moral side constraints limiting
the acceptable means to bring about the setting in place.
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sunbathers able to help are morally obligated to help rescue those in peril,
at least to the extent that can do so at reasonable cost and risk to themselves,
taking into account what is at stake for those in danger of drowning just
offshore. Here, we can stipulate also that if all participate in the rescue
effort in an efficient cooperative manner, the costs of rescue that fall on
each of the rescuers decreases. Let us assume further that whatever limited
obligation one has to make sacrifices to those in peril, one does not fulfill
the obligation by making ineffective, inefficient efforts to help. Beseeching
the ocean gods, hugging other sunbathers present at the scene and comforting
them, swimming into shark infested water when there is a safe boat available
for rescue service near at hand, and so on, would not fulfill the duty to
rescue as it applies here.
Now add another feature. Perhaps a subset of those persons near the site
of the emergency have lifeguard training. So, it is the case that some persons
present at the scene, and they alone, are competent to organize those present
quickly into an effective team that can save all of those in peril without
imposing excessive cost or risk on any potential rescuers. The condition
for this to occur is that the sunbathers, recognizing the need to submit to
the authority of the competent and take orders from them, do so. In this
situation, one has a duty to take effective steps to facilitate rescue of those
in peril, and to fulfill this duty, one must obey the commands of a competent
few who have asserted a claim to be obeyed on this basis. In this scenario,
I submit, the duty to assist those in peril generates a further duty to accept
the authority of the competent and obey their commands.
The extension of the lesson of the beach example to the conclusion that,
in some conditions, one lacks a right to a democratic say and moreover
has a duty to submit to well-functioning nondemocratic rule is straightforward.
Anarchy is a disaster. Living in proximity to others in the absence of a
functioning government that commands a mostly effective monopoly on
the use of violence creates excessive risk of harm and especially risk of
harm to vulnerable persons, those susceptible to predation. In this situation,
one has a duty, when one can do so at reasonable cost, to join with others
to establish a well-functioning government or to cooperate with others to
sustain it if one already exists.32 If—big if—to be well functioning in the
circumstances, any government must be nondemocratic, one has a duty to
cooperate with nondemocratic political arrangements.
32. See Christopher H. Wellman, Liberalism, Samaritanism, and Political Legitimacy,
25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 211, 219–23 (1996).
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Notice also that the view being defended here would be misstated if
formulated in terms of a right of the competent to rule. Consider this
argument for rule by the competent stated by David Copp. To clarify, he
does not himself endorse the argument:
(1) There are political truths.
(2) The members of a small intelligentsia have much better knowledge
of the centrally important political truths than anyone else.
[(3) If someone has knowledge of the centrally important political
truths, and is not otherwise disqualified—by being selfish or
corrupt—then she has a claim to a share in the ruling of society,
and no one who lacks such knowledge has any such claim.
Therefore:]
(4) The qualified members of the intelligentsia, and they alone, have
a claim to share in the ruling of society.33
There is a slide in this argument from positing that some have much
better knowledge than others to a positing that some have “knowledge of
the centrally important political truths.”34 That some have better knowledge
than others is compatible with holding that those with lesser knowledge
have knowledge about centrally important truths that are crucial input for
good decisions. Wisdom of the crowd considerations could block acceptance
of three and four given that one and two are accepted.
Copp’s second point might be doubted on the ground that there is no
small, stable group of people who know the centrally important political
truths needed for sound choice of laws and other public policies. The key
political truths might be widely different, depending on what issue is under
review. The small group might be variable from decision to decision. What
truths are key to decision-making might shift in unpredictable ways over
time, and sometimes suddenly and discontinuously.
But the crucial reason for rejecting three is that it is fully compatible
with this possible scenario: Some selfless and noncorrupt people have full
knowledge of the entire set of centrally important political truths relevant
to political decisions that need to be made, but nonetheless best results
would be reached by not assigning these people political power and instead
giving an equal democratic say to all settled adult members of society.
That is, rule by experts might deliver better laws and public policies but
generate bad results in other ways. Giving the people the franchise might
tend to encourage widespread public spiritedness, or facilitate society

33.

David Copp, Could Political Truth Be a Hazard for Democracy?, in THE IDEA
supra note 5, at 101, 107.
Id. at 106.

OF DEMOCRACY,

34.
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wide solidarity and willingness to cooperate for the common good.35
A democratic society might end up with worse laws and better lives for
people, or greater overall rights fulfillment, over time, compared to what
rule by experts would tend to bring about.
It does not follow from the fact that there are identifiable political experts,
as asserted by Copp’s first and second points, that they have a right to rule
—claim three. According to the best results theory, simply being a member
of a political society does not give one a right to a share in political decisionmaking, because denying one such rights may bring about expectably better
results. According to the best results theory, being a political expert among
nonexperts does not give one a right to a share, much less a preponderant
share, in political decision-making, because denying one such a right may
bring about expectably better results.36 Competence matters just insofar as
assigning special power to its possessor would bring about better outcomes.
VI. DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT PRECLUDE
FULFILLING RAWLSIAN PRINCIPLES
A liberal society, one fulfilling Rawlsian principles of justice but for its
insistence on political democracy, could be nondemocratic. In some possible
circumstances, choice of democratic political arrangements might preclude
fulfilling these Rawlsian principles as fully as we could, if we opted instead
for nondemocracy.
The right to a democratic say is the claim that each adult person has a
right to be a full member of some political society, entitled to run for office
and vote—on a one person, one vote basis—in free and fair majority rule
elections that directly or indirectly determine the content of the laws and
policies that the government enforces on all members of society.
A society might be more or less democratic along several dimensions
of assessment:

35. For speculation to this effect, see JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 45–69 (H. Holt 2014) (1861). Jason Brennan suggests that
Mill’s speculation has not been empirically confirmed in the study of actual democracies,
but the questions we really need to resolve here are counterfactual: would indirect effects
—those not operating through quality of laws—of the operation of various democratic
systems over time in a given society likely be better than what would ensue from feasible
nondemocratic alternatives. See JASON BRENNAN, AGAINST DEMOCRACY 54–73 (2016).
36. This paragraph rehearses an argument advanced in my previous work. See Arneson,
Elitism, supra note 5, at 169.
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(1) The more it is the case that freedom of expression regarding
public affairs and matters that might bear on public policy
prevails in society, other things being equal, the more democratic
the society.
(2) The more it is the case that freedom to associate with likeminded
individuals to seek to advance ideas about how we should
live and how we should organize our common life prevails
in society, the more democratic it is, all else equal.
(3) The more it is the case that permanently settled adults can
establish citizenship in the political society they inhabit, citizenship
including the franchise, the more democratic the society, all
else being equal.
(4) The more it is the case that the legislation and governmental
policies administered and enforced in a particular political
society are controlled by elections in which all votes are equal
and the election process is free—no intimidation or extortion
of political opponents, and so on—the more democratic the
society, all else being equal.
(5) The greater the allowable scope for majority rule decisionmaking, the more democratic the society, other things being
equal. If some types of issue—like war and peace, foreign
policy, free speech, nondiscrimination—are not permitted to
be settled by majority rule decision-making, that restriction
lessens the allowable scope for majority rule decision-making.
(6) The more it is the case that the present will of the majority
of citizens can be made effective in the formation of public
policy and the choice of public officials, the more democratic
the society, all else being equal. The shorter the time lag
between shift of majority rule and corresponding shift in
public policy, the more democratic the society, all else equal.
(7) The more it is the case that any adult citizens with the same
political talent and the same willingness to spend political
resources and personal energy to influence the outcomes of
the political process have the same chance to influence the
outcomes of the political process, the more democratic the
society, other things being equal. This is the equal opportunity
for political influence ideal. If your political convictions
happen to be closer to the preexisting political opinions of
most people in society than another’s, and you have greater
chances of influencing outcomes of the political process for
this reason, this inequality of opportunity does not prevent
the other person and you having equal opportunity for political
influence in this matter.
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The first two dimensions of assessment, free speech and freedom
of association, do not by themselves make a society as democratic even
by a bit. Rather, once majority-rule voting procedures—three and four above
—are in place, at least at some threshold level, a society is more democratic,
the more it is the case that all seven conditions listed are fulfilled. To
determine how democratic a society is overall on this conception, one would
have to assign proper weights to the seven dimensions, a task I do not attempt.
Against these stipulations, one might object that they capture, if anything,
majoritarianism—let the majority rule—not the ideal of constitutional or
republican democracy, which is shaped by an aspiration to limit majority
rule in order to guard against tyranny of the majority. In a constitutional
democracy, there is a constitution that includes separation of powers
across branches of government and a substantive bill of rights protecting
fundamental liberties, with the constitution being interpreted by judicial
review that limits to some extent the laws and policies a majority of voters
can enact.
I think it is worth considering democracy fundamentally as majority
rule, direct or indirect, with an equal franchise for all adult members
of society. A constitution with a bill of rights administered by judicial review
that aims to ensure a genuine democratic say for all members of society
over time, as theorized years ago by John Hart Ely, is not an alternative to
majoritarian democracy but rather essentially a means for sustaining it
over time.37 But if constitutional democracy is understood as it usually is,
as a means to insulate some substantial norms such as a conception of
individual liberty against majority rule, we really have a mixed view. There
is nothing in the basic idea of rule by the people that says that rule by the
people must conform to some further substantive norms, and whatever further
norms you endorse, you could incorporate them in a nondemocratic alternative
to democracy.
VII. EPISTOCRACY
To illustrate this possibility, we can envisage a political regime that is
robustly nondemocratic, a state in which one political party holds a monopoly
of political power. Recent empirical study of nondemocratic political regimes
has focused on the phenomenon of semi-democratic states, in which there

37. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
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are elections and trappings of democracy but elections are not free and
fair and the ruling political party uses its control of state power to maintain
itself in power by jailing opposition leaders, restricting press freedom and
using state owned media as propaganda outlets promoting the party in
power, rigging elections, and so on.38 Recent normative theory discussion
of nondemocratic governance structures has focused on epistocracy. The
term refers to a range of possible political arrangements designed to restrict
the democratic franchise to members of society who are superior to others
in knowledge and political competence. The locus classicus of the proposal
is the plural voting scheme endorsed by J.S. Mill in his Considerations on
Representative Government. In this scheme, all citizens have a vote, but
those who are more highly educated or who pass a competence exam are
assigned extra votes.39
The beauty of epistocracy is that, without having to make any claims
about the substantive content of the justice principles that a government
should seek to fulfill, we identify a procedure that is claimed likely to
bring about political decision-making that will enact laws and policies that
will be more likely than feasible alternative procedures to achieve morally
correct results, whatever they might be. The procedure seeks to give extra
power to the competent, and the competent will identify what justice requires
here and now and press for that.
The down side of epistocracy is that whatever we believe is the particular
set of moral principles that a government should seek to fulfill, it is hard
to see how any content neutral test for competence will tend to give extra
power to people who are likely to press for that. This is not a problem if
we can be assured that we can identify a test that will pick out not just
people who are politically competent in a neutral sense, good at strategic
reasoning, good at means ends calculation, knowledgeable about public
affairs, and so on, but more importantly people who are normatively competent,
able to identify justice and truth whatever they might be. After all, neutral
political competence could be harnessed to bad ends as easily as good ends.
But a neutral test for normative political competence seems elusive. At
least, we do not have a clue how to construct such a test.
This is far from a knockdown objection to the range of epistocracy proposals.
But there is a broad alternative—seeking to put in power a political party
that is dedicated to a particular conception of justice with the best evidence

38. See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM:
HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 3 (2010).
39. See MILL, supra note 35, 155–80. The proposal is discussed throughout various
works. See generally BEITZ, supra note 5, 31–48; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(original ed. 1971); Arneson, Elitism, supra note 5, at 156–84; Jason Brennan, The Right
to a Competent Electorate, 61 PHIL. Q. 700, 701 (2011); Estlund, supra note 14, 53–55.
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relative credentials we can secure.40 Call this the Bolshevik strategy. As
carried out by Bukharin, Stalin, and the Soviet Communist apparatus, it
has, to put it mildly, a horrible historical track record.41 But a one party
regime need not be illiberal. As Jason Brennan observes, as a conceptual
matter a democracy can be illiberal and a nondemocracy can be liberal—
notwithstanding the fact that democracy has a much better track record in
protecting civil and personal freedoms than autocracies and dictatorships.42
For concreteness, imagine a political party committed to promoting justice
as fairness, as elaborated by John Rawls, succeeds in gaining a monopoly
of political power. The Rawlsian Justice Party rules. Or better, we should
label the group Quasi-Rawlsian Justice Party (QRJP), because it eschews
democratic rule. Recall Rawls’s principles encapsulating justice as fairness:
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all;
and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to
be guaranteed their fair value.
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: [F]irst, they are
to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit
of the least advantaged members of society.43

The second part of this second principle is called the “difference principle.”
The equal basic liberties are those that must be secured to enable people
to develop and exercise their two fundamental moral powers to cooperate
with others on terms recognized as fair and to adopt, pursue, and perhaps

40. The idea is that a form of political governance might bring about better results
than democracy not by specially empowering experts, but by specially empowering those
with a particular view of justice. The acceptability of this claim—for those who do not see it
as immediately beyond the pale—would clearly depend on the moral quality of the view being
empowered. The Quasi-Rawlsian Justice Party, perhaps; the Quasi-Hitlerite Justice Party,
not so much. One could also imagine a regime that could appeal both to a meritocracy justification
and a morally superior ideology justification to argue for its moral acceptability. I assume
a superior ideology attempt at justification could be made compatible with fallibilism, the
view that any moral doctrine asserted at any given time is open to refutation on the basis
of future moral argument and is very likely to be at least partly wrong. The claim would
be that, for now, on the evidence and argument now available, there is sufficient reason to
enact this rather than other candidate doctrines.
41. See PIPES, supra note 4, at 343–81.
42. BRENNAN, supra note 35, at 1–8.
43. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 5–6 (2005); see RAWLS, supra note 39, at
266.
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revise a conception of their good. They are specified by a not necessarily
complete list:
[P]olitical liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought;
freedom of the person [which includes freedom from psychological oppression
and physical assault and dismemberment—integrity of the person] . . . along
with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and
seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.44

Fair equality of opportunity is satisfied in society just in case all those
with equal native talent and ambition have the same prospects of success
in competitions for specially advantageous positions. The fair value of
political liberty is secured just in case all those with equal political talent
and political ambition have the same prospects of attaining public office—
so being born in one or another economic or social class does not affect
one’s chances of being politically influential. The goods that justice secures
are primary social goods, general-purpose resources. Finally, the equal
liberties principle has strict lexical priority over the principle regulating
social and economic inequalities and, within that principle, fair equality of
opportunity has strict lexical priority over the difference principle.
If you subtract democratic rights from this set of principles, what remains
as the program of QRJP? For starters, fair equality of opportunity (FEO),
the difference principle, and the priority of FEO. The difference principle
might be interpreted as requiring maximization of the social and economic
primary goods prospects of the social group worst off in this respect.
Perhaps more important, justice as fairness minus political democracy
rights still affirms a strong doctrine of equal basic liberties. These include
freedom of speech and assembly—and association—liberty of conscience
and freedom of thought, freedom of the person as stated, the right to hold
personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined
by the concept of the rule of law. QRJP also affirms lexical priority of
equal basic liberties over the principle regulating distribution of social and
economic benefits.
The fair value of political liberty might seem to be extinguished since
the political liberty in question is the freedom to stand for office in free
and fair elections. But a version of fair value of political liberty can remain
in Rawlsian justice shorn of its democratic commitment. We are envisaging
that a political party committed to Rawlsian justice has a monopoly of
political power. But this is compatible with the insistence that membership
in this organization, and the opportunity to rise in its ranks, is regulated by a
shadow of fair equality of opportunity: all those with the same native talent

44.
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and the same ambition to be influential in advancing Rawlsian justice
have the same prospects of securing membership in QRJP and of rising to
positions of greater influence.45 For other citizens, we can borrow Rawls’s
idea of a decent consultation hierarchy, and affirm that all members of
society have an equal right to assemble and organize and proselytize for
their ideas and to petition government and present grievances and proposal
as input to the deliberative governmental process, all with equal native
talent and equal political ambition having equal opportunity to be influential
in this consultative process.46 I acknowledge this mimicry of the fair value
of political liberty will seem Pickwickian to committed democrats.47
Rawlsian basic liberties might strike us as thin in their guarantees of
personal freedom and economic freedom.48 Rawls stipulates that freedom
45. Daniel Bell interprets the current Chinese regime as seeking to justify its rule
as legitimate, in part on the ground that the Chinese Communist Party is a meritocracy, so
those who exercise political rule are those selected as most qualified to rule. DANIEL A.
BELL, THE CHINA MODEL: POLITICAL MERITOCRACY AND THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRACY 1–2
(2015). Bell does not hold that this claim to being a meritocracy is warranted or that the
Chinese regime is overall legitimate. See id. More tentatively, he suggests that a political
order that qualifies as a genuine meritocracy, but fails to be democratic, might qualify as
morally legitimate. See id. at 179–98. In passing, I note that according to an instrumentalist or
best results approach, a political society could conceivably be a perfect meritocracy, yet
be morally unacceptable. This situation would exist if putting the most qualified people
in positions of authority brings about worse results, impartially assessed, than would
be brought about instead by alternative feasible political arrangements.
46. For the idea of a decent consultation hierarchy, see JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF
PEOPLES 71–75 (1999).
47. The nondemocratic state will rely on commanding sufficient military and police
force to be able to protect itself from external and internal aggression and to elicit sufficient
compliance with its laws and public policies so that the society is well functioning. This
necessity may put pressure on the extent to which FEO can be implemented. Consider top
military officers. If they lack allegiance to the regime, the threat of a military coup arises.
So maybe an ideological test must be prerequisite to gaining a top military post? In this
case, the competition for this post will, at most, satisfy a constricted version of FEO. With
this restricted version of FEO in place, all those with the same native talent and same
ambition, with ambition broadly understood to include ambition to advance the Rawlsian
program, have the same prospects of success in competitions to fill political posts. If the
regime has a sufficiently shaky grip on power, the need for security may end up greatly
eroding the level of equal basic liberty provision the QRJP program promises. Maintaining
regime security can require severe repression. See generally Tiberiu Dragu & Adam
Przeworski, Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
77 (2019). The response here is that if a state can only maintain itself by unjust restriction
of individual liberty, the state should give way, allow it to be replaced by another. “Justice”
delivered by gulags is not justice.
48. John Tomasi argues that thick economic freedoms such as the right to own
private property in the means of production, the right to start and operate a business enterprise
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of the person prohibits a command economy and requires that all citizens
be able to compete for employment in a labor market offering a wide array
of positions.49 One could strengthen this requirement of economic freedom
by requiring that individuals have freedom to trade as they choose with
property they legitimately possess on a competitive market, and strengthen
this requirement of personal freedom by requiring that individuals must
be free to live as they choose so long as they do not thereby harm others
in certain specified ways that violate their rights.
The discussion in this section illustrates a general point. Rejecting the
claim that there is a fundamental moral right to a democratic say and that
making society more democratic does not, in itself, make the society more
just is compatible with affirming any of a wide range of accounts of the
substance of social justice, fundamental level morality. Rejecting democracy,
one can be committed to a robust set of liberal egalitarian and broadly
democratic values.
VIII. IN REAL-WORLD CONDITIONS, SHOULD OUR COMMITMENT TO
DEMOCRACY BE HEDGED?
Are the conditions in which nondemocracy would be likely to outperform
democracy by justice standards so empirically unlikely to obtain as to
render the issue, to what extent should we be committed democrats, not
worth discussing? Maybe, maybe not.
The discussions in this Article may strike some readers as akin to
prolegomena to a theory of Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny. Santa Claus
and his reindeer, as standardly characterized, provide a normatively attractive,
or at least normatively plausible system for delivering toys to children at
Christmas with great efficiency and fairness. Recall: “[H]e’s making a
list, he’s checking it twice, he’s gonna find out who’s naughty or nice,
Santa Claus is coming to town.”50 But the theory is not worth discussing
because it is so empirically far-fetched. Same goes, perhaps, for the
characterizations of conceivable, just nondemocratic political regimes.
What is the point?

with willing investors and employees, and the right to profit from money lending should
be included among Rawls’s equal basic liberties. See JOHN TOMASI, FREE MARKET FAIRNESS
16–17 (2012). This is a tricky call, given that in Rawls’s scheme, the equal liberties principle,
has strict priority over the other principles of justice. This means no restriction of any basic
liberty to gain any amount of nonbasic liberty justice value. The right inference here may be
that the lexical priority idea should be deleted in the most plausible formulation of Rawlsian
principles. See id. at 216–19.
49. RAWLS, supra note 39, 271–76.
50. FAITH HILL, Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town, on JOY TO THE WORLD (Warner
Bros. 2008).
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First, I am not presenting an instrumentalist case for nondemocracy.
I am for democracy, on instrumental grounds. Nor am I suggesting that
normatively attractive nondemocratic forms of governance are feasible or
likely to be so in the near future, or that a morally sensitive cost and benefit
calculation pushes extant nondemocracies toward the top of the list of
viable choices.51 However, the twenty-first century may present decision
problems that call for authoritarian solutions.
Climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions threatens to unleash
great harms in the future. The magnitude and distribution of these harms
depend on what policies political societies pursue over the coming decades.
As many have noted, the climate change problem combines issues about
justice between generations and global distributive justice. The latter problem
is exacerbated for those who hold any of a wide range of moral views that
imply that, independent of the climate change issue, there is a moral
imperative to facilitate the economic development of poor countries. The
natural result of the economic development of poor countries is greatly
increased greenhouse gas emissions. Viewed in this light, the problem
becomes, how to bring about worldwide cooperation across all nations
and peoples of the world that will prevent greenhouse gas emissions from
bringing about too much global warming and, consequently, vast harm to
future generations, mitigate the costs of global warming that will nonetheless
ensue and especially prevent these costs from bearing severely on worse
off inhabitants of the Earth and, in particular, the global poor, and also
robustly facilitate economic development that brings stable prosperity to
poor countries and especially to the global poor.
Stated baldly, the problem looks to be obviously insoluble. To be sure,
one can draw up solutions on paper, but what looks insoluble is the problem
of finding some ethically decent solution that stands a chance of being
implemented. Implementation of a solution would require global regulatory
governance, and the international order shows no signs of delivering such
governance in the coming decades.
If one tries to imagine a course of events that is at all likely to occur and
that would to some degree address the problem, one pictures a brutal exercise
of big power politics. Future climate change unleashes catastrophes that
51. My wishy-washy championing of Bukarinism in the opening paragraph is limited
to favoring Bukharinism as elaborated by his biographer over Stalinism as actually practiced.
This leaves open the possibility that a still better option in the 1920s would have been a
Bolshevik abdication of power at that time, and definitely leaves open the possibility that
upending the shaky beginnings of Russian democracy back in in 1917 was unjustified.
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impel powerful nations to seek some means of averting further catastrophes.
The world’s big powers as they will be thirty or fifty or eighty years from
now work out a deal that prevents greenhouse gas emissions from bringing
about a future parade of horribles. They work out a deal that is very much
to their interests, and likely very much to the disadvantage of the rest of
the world and especially its poorest and weakest nations and their inhabitants.
The big powers enforce this deal on the rest of the world, using their military
superiority to coerce most of the world’s inhabitants into compliance. In
this imagined scenario, the leaders of the big powers are not motivated by
altruistic concern for distant future generations or for the then contemporary
global poor. The leaders of each big power are motivated to protect the
interests of their current members’ interests and the members of their near
term future generations. With luck, the interests of more distant future
generations ride along on the interests of near term generations. The process
is brutal and the outcome manifestly unfair, yet superior to possible future
courses of events in which no such big power grand bargain is reached.
One such future course of events involves devastating wars among big
powers struggling for advantage on a hotter planet.
Another conceivable route to a grand bargain among nations would be
an international treaty. To be effective, such a treaty would have to encompass
almost all nations, or else processes that emit greenhouse gases would
migrate to countries that do not sign the treaty. The treaty could adjust to
provide sweetened terms to holdout nations, but this would encourage
holding out, or belated backing out of the treaty if one initially signed on.
Presumably, a sufficiently strong coalition of nations could coerce nations
that have not signed into joining up. The prospects of such an international
negotiation are hard to gauge. For democratic nations, signing on incurs
significant costs to be borne by present members of society for the sake
of avoiding the imposition of harms on future generations and contemporary
distant needy strangers in poor countries.52 Can we expect democratic voters
willingly to incur the morally necessary sacrifices?

52. This claim needs defense. John Broome has observed that, given the enormous
costs that will fall on future generations if greenhouse gas emissions are not checked, it is
possible to devise a treaty now according to which present people reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, and also better themselves in other ways that impose costs on future generations, in
such a way that no one is made worse off by this treaty and some are made better off, now
and in future. See JOHN BROOME, CLIMATE MATTERS: ETHICS IN A WARMING WORLD 190
(2012). Moreover, given the enormous gains that suitable greenhouse gas emission reduction
will bring about, most people can be made significantly better off by the treaty. See id. at
187–92. For somewhat related discussion, see ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH,
CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 189–92 (2010).
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Of course, identifying a possible problem with standing fast by democracy
no more implies some nondemocratic alternative would be superior than
identifying a problem of market failure automatically makes a successful
case for government regulation to correct the problem. To make progress,
we need future events to resolve uncertainty to the point that analysis could
usefully commence of when a person on horseback promising to dispense
with democratic dithering should be followed.
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